Non-proliferation and assurance of supply. Recent models of international nuclear cooperation. Vol. 1. Summaries.


Dolzer,-R.; Hilf,-M. (Max-Planck-Institut fuer auslaendisches oeffentliches Recht und Voelkerrecht, Heidelberg (Germany, F.R.)); Muench,-E.; Richter,-B.; Schlupp,-C.; Stein,-G. With increased utilization of nuclear energy worldwide institutional mechanisms could be applied which would serve both non-proliferation and assurance of supply. Participation in a multinational fuel cycle centre would indeed have advantages at the front and back end for states with fairly small nuclear programmes. However, legal, political and organizational aspects make the realization of models of this type seem unrealistic. An international storage system for excess separated plutonium would have advantages, both with respect to non-proliferation and also assurance of supply, if for this model certain reservations could be suspended or their effects considerably reduced, for example by determining suitable conditions. A store for spent fuel elements would similarly provide advantages in supply assurance for countries with fairly small nuclear programmes. In case of interruptions in supply at the front end of the fuel cycle two emergency mechanisms are suggested. On the one hand a fuel bank, which seems to be more suitable for small consumers, as well as a uranium safety net, which could be advantageous for large-scale consumers and is characterized by great flexibility. (orig.).